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Preface 
The food problem is to a large extent a local one. Accord- 
ingly, the starting point in the Food and Agriculture research 
of IIASA is the modeling of national food and agricultural 
systems. After having investigated local, national strategies 
directed towards specific goals (e.g. introducing new techno- 
logies, changing the agricult.ura1 structure, etc.) a generali- 
zation will be possible and conclusions can be drawn concerning 
the global outcomes of changing agricultural systems. Thus, 
the global investigation will be based on national models and 
their interactions. 
To reflect these interactions in a model, a methodological 
research is required which is concerned with the linkage of 
national models for food and agriculture. This paper is the 
third of a series on this topic. 
Previously on this topic: RM-77-2, Linking National Models of 
Food and Agriculture: An Introduction, January 1977. 
RM-77-19, Analysis of a National 
Model with Domestic Price Policies and Quota on International 
Trade, April 1977. 

Abstract 
This paper is the third in the series on the linkage of 
national models of food and agriculture. 
International agreements are discussed in which given levels 
of world market prices are aimed at. Buffer stock agreement, 
various compensatory financing schemes and specific types of 
cartels are represented in general equilibrium models of barter 
exchange. 
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Introduction 
When all the actors on world markets are considered to be 
price takers the resulting equilibrium prices on these markets 
are rather incidentaloutcomes, although policies of the actors 
such as stock policies will influence world market prices. 
In the present paper, international policies which explicitly 
aim at reaching certain given world market prices are discussed. 
Various instruments can be used to realize such a policy. Within 
the framework of a general equilibrium model of barter exchange 
(no money explicitly introduced), the following schemes are 
discussed: 
1. An international buffer stock agency which tries to keep 
prices (a) at given levels, 
(b) within given ranae. 
2. An agreement to keep world market prices at given levels by 
adjusting internal prices (a) for all nations, 
(b) for a subset of nations. 
This agreement also has a compensatory finance interpretation, 
in which developing nations are compensated against adverse 
develo~ment on the world market. 
3. Various other com.pensatory financinq schemes. 
Price formation on international commodity markets has become 
more and more an issue of political debate, the oil crisis and 
the price boom for agricultural commodities in 1973-74 have stimu- 
lated the discussion. 
The International Development Strategy adopted by the United 
Nations for the Second Development Decade 161 emphasizes the improve- 
ment of international trade relations in favour of the least 
developed countries. This was re-emphasized in the U.N. Declara- 
tion and Programme of Action on a New International Economic Order. 
UNCTAD's Committee on Commodities has proposed both a multi-commodity 
buffer stock and schemes of compensatory financing. All these 
proposals imply that international agreemsnts should be made by 
which world market prices could be kept at target levels. How 
these targets should be fixed is an open issue and a very political 
one. The welfare implications of different schemes are difficult 
to evaluate theoretically because of all the distortions already 
introduced by the national policies. This paper, therefore, limits 
itself to the presentation of some models in which price targets 
are given. 
Before the international policy schemes are discussed, the 
main points of the two previous papers will be summarized: 
1. A national model is considered as a continuous nondiffer- 
W 
entiable excess demand function: z = z (p ) , where P 
is the vector of world market prices for n-1 agricultural 
commodities and one (residual) nonagricultural commodity, 
is the vector of excess demand (demand minus supply) j 
by the jth country. 
2. The national excess demand is assumed to satisfy for all 
W W W prices p : p zj + k .  (p ) = 0 , where k is set in such a 
I j 
way that Ik = 0 ; k. is a continuous function of prices. j I 
This means that the balance of trade of the world is in 
equilibrium in any given period of time and that the balance 
of trade of a nation has a predetermined disequilibrium, k . j 
3. National excess demand is assumed to be homogenous of degree 
zero in world market prices. 
4. Given 1, 2, and 3, a competitive equilibrium can be shown 
to exist on the world market, that is a price vector p w* 
such that world excess demand is nonpositive: 
w* 
which implies that at prices p , a feasible allocation exists. 
The equilibrium may be nonunique. (1 
5. A national model describes how at given world market prices 
a national excess demand is arrived at. This implies that 
a unique excess demand should correspond to given world 
market prices. This sets restrictions on the specification 
of the national models. It however makes a modular approach 
The issue of the computation of equilibrium prices on the 
world market will be discussed in the next forthcoming 
paper in this series, although some remarks on this topic 
are made in Appendix 2. 
possible in the sense that it makes it feasible to 
develop independently cuite different national models. 
A. national model for a market economy should describe 
?rice formation on domestic narkets. Under the free 
trade assum~tion, this is computation all^ a simple matter, 
the question, however, is not so simple when domestic 
price policies, buffer stocks and quota on international 
trade are considered. These problems have been discussed 
in [4], where algorithms have been developed 
The Results of [4] are surmarized below. The numerical 
irpplementations of the algorithms will be reported in a separate 
paper. 
Domestic Domestic Free Price Price Quota Trade Policy Policy and Quota 
One consumer* 
no production 1 
More consumers 
no production 1 
One consumer* 
production 1 
More consumers 
production 1 
direct computation; 
iteration over taxation rate (assumption: no inferior goods); 
convex programming problem; 4 , 5  can solve special cases of 
this; 
complementary pivoting algorithm. The commodities with quota 
form a linear expenditure subsystem; several taxation poli- 
cies are possible; 
4  but also valid for generalized C.E.S. utility function; 
parametric convex programming; 
only solved for cases with quota on inputs which are not 
consumer goods. 
* A Hicksian economy is considered as an economy with one 
consumer. 
1 .  A PlODEL WITH STOCK ADJLJSTI!ENT UNDER STRONG RIGIDITIES 
In this paragraph a model will be presented which describes 
a world market equilibrium in which stock adjustment prevails 
over price adjustment: as long as the vector of stocks of 
commodities remains within given bounds no price adjustment 
takes place. We call this a strong price rigidity. A weak 
price rigidity is a more general case in which, as long as 
stocks permit prices are restricted to remain within uiven 
bounds; this will be discussed in the following paragraph. 
First the model will be written out, then an existence 
proof for the equilibrium will be presented, some implications of 
the model will be discussed and finally some possible appli- 
cations will be discussed. In loose terms, the auestion is does 
aprice vector on the world market exist, such that: 
- the aggregate excess demand after stock adjustment is 
nonpositive; 
- the constraints on stocks are satisfied; 
- the equilibrium prices only deviate from target 
prices when constraints on stocks are effective and do 
. ..
so in the intuitively expected sense; 
- the a nriori stock conunitment expressed in target prices 
will not be over drawn and will actually be met at least 
as long as not all the mini~um constraints on stocks are 
effective? 
1.1 The model 
a) Aggregate net demand functions 
Consider: 
W 
z = z(p It) 
which satisfies 
z is the net demand (= aggregate endowments - aggregate demand), 
where the demand is defined excluding demand by a stock agency; 
pW is the current world market price; t is the income committed 
for the stock holding activity. It is assumed that these com- 
mitments are distributed over consumers (countries) in such a 
W j + k  way that they are smaller than the wealth: tj < p y j 
j (y endowment vector, k .  credit received ; C k = 0). As only I j 
world market prices will be discussed here we further drop the 
superscript w. The same distributional problems and opportunities 
come up as were discussed in [ 4 ,  § 1.3.21 . 
The aggregate net demand correspondence is assumed to be 
represented by continuous functions (the restriction is 
only needed for computational reasons). The functions are ass- 
umed to be bounded below. 
b) Policy Equations 
i = y - x-s = -(z+s) final stock 
y = YCJ + yP definition 
i min 5 i ( i max 
- - 
a priori commitment 
boundaries on final 
stocks 
p = p P + l - ~ - V  definition 
t = p smin - v smax + pp(yg+~yP) effective commitment 
c) Market equilibrium conditions 
s = max(o,- (imax + z)) 
S,P,V,Pli 2 0 
~ ( i  - imin) = 0 
v(i - imax) = 0 
d) Assumptions on constraints 
imin 1 - 0 
6 imin 5 - p(yg + +yP) - 5 p imax 
From the stock adjustment follows 
excess supply 
y is the vector of endowments, s is the free dis3osal or excess 
supply, i is the final stock, x is the demand bv the nations. 
yg is thought to be an external stock e.g. a stock owned by an 1) 
international agency before exchange. We may assume yq = i t t-1 
yP is the total endowment owned by the nations themselves. 
The nations commit themselves to make available for the 
stock a certain maximum amount of wealth p(yg + $yP) expressed 
- 
in target prices, p. The stock agency is allowed to deviate 
from this c~n~mitment only to finance final stocks (when actual 
prices deviate from target prices). Note that the commitment is a 
scalor. The models, therefore, do not imaly that a stock needs to 
be carried over in kind bv the aqency althoucrh this may be one way 
to interpret the model. The commitment is expressed as an inter- 
national income transfer, not as a domestic tax. 
Note also that the model is not implying that the stock policy 
can fully accomodate differences between supply and demand, price 
adjustments may be needed. 
1.2 Existence proof 
The proof of the existence of the equilibrium proceeds along 
the same lines as the proof for domestic equilibrium in [4,sec.l]. 
It is again only a slight extension of Debreu's proof (see 
appendix [I] 1 .  The proof will only be presented in shorthand. The 
details are comparable to those in [4, sectionl]. Walras Law 
for this case is: 
Substituting the prlce definition and the rule for effective 
commitment one gets : 
( p p + p - v )  i = p . i m i n - v . i r n a ~ + p . ~ ( ~ ~ + $ ~ ~ )  . 
' 1  In this interpreta ion all the stocks are physically held by 
the agency and $py6 is a new conmitment which is used to 
buy new stocks for the agency. The variable $ may therefore 
become zero once the agency has built up sufficient stocks. 
Consider the following linear programme: 
P max J = p(imin - i) + v(i - imax) - pG(i - Y' + @Y ) 
S.T. L(pi + Vi + pci) = 1 
and PI V I  P 2 0 
I I  and p s = o  
its given 
Define p as the set of constraints of the linear programme. 
The linear programme defines a mapping which maps p into 
itself and is upper semicontinuous; p is a compact, closed, convex 
set; the mapping p + I (p) is upper semicontinuous to that there 
* . *  * * *  
will be by Kakutani's theorem a fixed point (sI1 , p ,v,p ) in 
* * * * *- * P 
which p (imin - i ) + V (i - imax) - p p (i - (yg + @y- ) ) = 0 
by Walras' Law. 
1) The commodities can now be divided into two groups: 
- group 1 with sh > 0 + p = 0 h 
- group 2 with s = 0 
We first note that by construction 
* 
imin < i = imax 1 =  1 1 
Rewriting the goal function into two component yields: 
where 
* * * * 
J1 = (pl - v ) imax 1 1 + p, (iminl - imaxl) 
* * * * * *- * 
J2 = v2 (imin 2 - i2) + v2(i2 - imax2) - p p2(i -(Y; + $1 
* 
Considering J 1  we may remark that because imin < imax 
* 1 = 1 ' 
by the maximum properties p1 = 0. 
2) Setting p = 0 and v = 0 we get 
* 
O z p 2  (imin - i2), 9 1 v =  0, p = 0; p v p E p 2 
(p is the set of constraints of the linear programme), 
therefore * 
imin < i2; 2 = 
we know by construction that 
* 
i < imax 2  = 2 - 
3 )  Setting p 2  = v 2  = 0 
and substituting 
we get 
so that 
* 
This means that J is a sum of nonpositive terms so that indivi- 
* dual terms are zero because J = 0 
Therefore we may summarize: 
* * * 
P (i - imin) = 0 imin 5 i 
- 
* * * * 
v  (i - imax) = 0 i - < i max 
- 
* * p*p ((y9 + gyp) - i = o p ( ( y g  + gyp) - i 5 - (I 
so that the equilibrium conditions of the model are satisfied. 
1.3 Interpretations of the model' 
1. A straightforward interpretation of the model is to assume 
that there exists an international buffer stock agency, which in 
the first years of its creation operates with direct contribu- 
tions in wealth or in kind ( 4 .  ppyP) from the participatinq 
nations and later on operates with its own stocks yg. The 
profits or losses of the operations are however carried by the 
nations. 
2 .  A slightly different interpretation suggests that a cartel 
is formed which operates the bufferstock, assuming that the other 
countries remain pricetakers. 
3. A third interpretation is that prices have an inherent rigi- 
dity: the price target is just last year's price. The rigidity 
is part of the market itself. One could call this interpreta- 
tion a disequilibrium interpretation. 
These three interpretations (altruistic, oligopolistic and 
structural) can be given to most models in this paper. 
2. A MODEL WITH STOCK ADJUSTMENT UNDER WEAK PRICE RIGIDITIES 
When the stock (agency) has to defend a price band instead 
of a price level many different scenario's may be thought of 
for the behaviour within the price band. This can be illus- 
.trated in a few graphs 
'7 i 
h 
This concept has a clear interpretation if one thinks 
- 
i;r Eh Ph Ph+ Eh Ph Ph+ it 
of an agency with a given endowment which operates on the 
imax 
market only when the limit of a price band is reached. 
ad (b) In this case the stock aqency performs a linear 
h 
imax h 
interpolation to determine its behaviour. The agent reacts 
I 
I 
I 
1 
1 
on all price deviations. 
ad (c), (d) These cases essentially show the same 
behaviour as cases of strong rigidity. 
--- ----- _ ( _ _ _ _ _ _  
I I 
I I I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I I 
I  I  
i m i n  I 1 
- - - 
E h  P h  ph' ph Ph +Ph 
ad (a) The case can be described as "stay where you are". 
h I I imin h 
I I 
I 1 
I I 
I I (c I I (dl 
- 
We shall in the following consider an arbitrary behavioural 
- 
function ih = i (p )  defined for p 5 p 5 5 which satisfies over h - - -- 
its range of definition the budget constraint: PI = p(yg + @yP). 
Within the price band the stock agency is just an actor like 
any other with an excess demand (which is assumed to satisfy stan- 
dard continuity assumptions). 
It can be considered as the aggregate of behaviour of many 
(e.g. national) actors. As a matter of fact the only reason for 
extracting this behaviour from the national models is to depict 
the behaviour at the band limits and outside of it. Only there 
do international agreements really need to be made. 
2.1 The model: 
The model is essentially the same as the one presented in 
the previous paragraph, so that it will only briefly be described. 
a) Aggregate excess demand 
z = z (p,t) which satisfies pz = -t . 
b) Policy 
i = y - x - s  final stock 
a prtpri commit- 
men t 
imin < i ( imax 
- 
- 
boundaries on stocks ~ 
p = q +  l ~ -  -.v definition I 
P t = p. imin - v. imax + q (yg + @y ) effective commit- 
men t 
- i = i (p) which satisfies 
target prices 
target stock within 
band 
- 
(€Ph - qh) (ih - ih) = 0 upper switch for 
target stock 
One miqht conceptualize this by assuming that the agency is en- 
dowed with the physical stock: yq + $yP 
C) Market equilibrium conditions 
s = max (0, - (imax + z) 
PliIS 0 
p (i - imin) = 0 
v (i - imax) = 0 
p s = o  
d) Assumptions on the constraints 
- 
E L p  
cgi 2 1 
- 
zpi 1 1 
0 5 -- imin 5 - y9 + $yP - 5 imax . 
2.2 Existence  roof 
lower switch for 
target stock 
constraints 
constraints 
The existence proof proceeds along the same lines as in 1.2: 
one tries to formulate a linear programme, such that in the fixed 
point of the mapping of prices and quantitites into itself, the 
goal function is zero by Walras' Law; then use the maximum prop- 
erty of the goal function to show that in the fixed point the 
equilibrium conditions are satisfied. 
Walras' Law is again: pi = t . 
This may be rewritten as 
p (imin - i) + v (i - imax) - q (i-(yg + $yP)) = 0 
The side conditions of the linear programme are the 
constraints on the variables in the model, the switches and 
the target prices. 
The linear programme is: 
J = max (p (imin - i) + v (i - imax) - q(i - yg + $yP))), 
The side conditions form a nonempty, compact convex set K, 
k = IE, q, p, v )  (intersection of compact convex sets). As the 
proof proceeds exactly as in 1.2, we directly state that the maximum 
properties of the goal function in the fixed point permit the con- 
clusions : 
* 
imin 5 i 5 imax, 
- - 
* 
p (i - imin) = 0 
* 
v (i - imax) = 0 
so that the equilibrium conditions of the model are satisfied. 
The model allows for the same interpretations as the model 
with strong price rigidities. 
Different assumptions are possible for the formulation of 
the rigidity (e.g. tying certain prices to a general price index) 
for this the reader is referred to ~ r 8 z e  [ 2 ] .  Note that under 
weak price rigidities the notion of a priori commitment asks 
for a physical interpretation as an endowment. 
3. PRICE RIGIDiTY ON THE WORLD MARKET THROUGH ADJUSTrq3NT OF ALL 
NATIONAL POLICIES 
Countries influence the world market prices throuqh their 
national policies. In this paragraph we investigate two world 
market prices whichcan be maintainedat a given level through adjust- 
ment of domestic policies, primarily of domestic prices. ' )  1 t i s  
a generally accepted observation that world market prices of 
agricultural commodities fluctuate more widely than domestic 
prices. The rigidity which is discussed here should therefore 
not be seen as a natural phenomenon but as the result of a concerted 
action of nations within the framework of something like a "new 
economic order"; one could think of integrated commodity agreements. 
Consider the following model: 
a) National excess demand functions are 
and satisfy 
and z < k. , k ,  finite, k > 0. 2 j =,  2 J j 
and z monotonous in t j j 
p is a scaling factor 
p is an international price on which countries react 
A more precise interpretation of the prices will be given below 
The gaper by ~ r 8 z e  I 2 1  can be interpreted as describing this 
type of policy by allocation of quota to countries. The 
quota have the property that they are for all participants 
maxima on imports or exports not minima. This result is, 
however, obtained by imposing a uniform quota allocation scheme 
(same quota for all agents) a somewhat artificial scheme in 
an international context. 
2) This can be guaranteed by imposition of an import quota on 
all national models. The assumption is needed for guaranteeing 
the existence of t. satisfying condition b). Note that again 
t. is not a dornestlc tax, but an international transfer of 
idcome. 
b) Determination of transfers t j 
t is determined in such a way that given (p, p )  j 
p pW z = 0 (assuming y > 0)we get py j j j + ' O t  
because 
p pW xj > 0, p $ 0 implies px > 0. It is assumed that j 
t. is unique. 
I 
Furthermore, we define 
t = - w  i f p = O  and z = k i f p = O  
j j 
Note that (z t . ) is homogeneous of degree zero in (p, p) , jt I 
we therefore may restrict (p,p) to: 
c) We consider the following maximization problem at world 
level (dropping of the subscript j means that a world aggregate 
is considered) : 
max p z - p t  
S.T. Cpi + p = 1 
z,t are given 
The mapping (z,t) x (p,~) defined by this is uppersemicontinuous 
* * * * 
and has a fixed point (z , t , p , p 1 . 
In this fixed point we get 
Economic Interpretations 
The model described here can be interpreted in several equivalent 
ways. The main common feature of the interpretations is that the 
model describes a concerted action of all countries in the world 
market, an oliqopolistic or structural interpretation is not 
appropriate here. 
a) Compensatory financing scheme 
The prices p are real world market prices but countries 
clear their balances of payment with each other according to 
different prices pW which have been agreed upon. Other com- 
pensatory financing schemes will be discussed in § 5 . 
b) Adjustment of internal prices 
In this interpretation the countries keep on the world 
market the prices pW as the real equilibrium prices. They do 
so by creating appropriate differentials with the prices pW . 
This can be done in two ways: 
1) adjustment of domestic price policy 
2) adjustment of quota 
The equilibrium solution of the model shows how much the 
internal prices have to be adjusted either by a common extra 
tariff or by a "fair" quota; a fair quota is defined here as a 
quota constraint which creates equal (shadow) price differentials 
for all participants. Illany non-fair quota allocations could 
of course realize the same world market prices but this is not 
considered here. A "fair" quota can imply a minimum on imports 
or exports, not only a maximum. 
q i .  PRICE POLICIES ON THE IVORLD fi4ARKET PURSUED BY A SUBSET OF 
THE PARTICIPANTS 
Consider the following model: 
There are two groups of countries' 
* W group 1 takes the world market prices p , as given; 
its excess demand function is 
z 1 = Zl (pW) 
W 
satisfying p z = 0 1 n 
we define: if pW = 0 then E zli = + ; i = 1, j = n, i is the 
i 
commodity index. 
* group 2 tries to keep world market prices at the level pW . 
In order to do this it adjusts its excess demand (mainly by 
adaptation of internal prices p2). It is however only willing/ 
able to do so as long as the excess supply of group 1 remains 
within the constraints: 
where s is defined as s, = max (-(r + zl), 0) . 1 
W In equilibrium p s, = 0 
The excess demand is 
z2 = z2 (p2, ta), z2 2 k, k finite, k > 0 
satisfying : p2z2 = ta ; z is assumed to be monotonous in 2 
ta 
ta = pt - pw, 
where wl = min (s + zl , y2) 1 
and t is set so that if p > 0 then p FwzZ = -p 1 + vr, else 
t= -m 
Again it is assumed that t is uniquely defined. 
* Define 
-W W pw = PP + v - v ;  P 2 0  
assume if p2 = 0 then z = k 2 
* Assumptions on the parameters 
Y is the vector of endowments at world level 
y2 is the vector of endowments of the second group 
p2 is the price at which countries within the 
second group exchange with each other; this is 
not a domestic price. 
The question is now, does an equilibrium exist such that: 
1) the world market is cleared; 
2) the excess demand of group 1 remains within the 
prespecified constraints; 
3) world market prices deviate from their target level, 
only if these constraints are effective and do so in 
the intuitively expected sense; 
4) the countries of the "Cartel" (group 2) do not 
generate a shortage on their balance of trade; 
5) the value of excess demand at target prices is zero 
(this last condition is only a side product of the 
proof 
--W These conditions guarantee that x2 = pp y2 - v1 + vr 2 - 0 
for all prices and strictly nositive for p > 0. Weaker 
conditions are possible but will not be investigated here. 
When ppW x2 > 0 the positiveness of income at prices p2 is 
also guaranteed because p x = ta + py p2+ 0.  2 2 2 2' 
Existence of equilibrium 
Summation of the different balance equations yields the 
goal function for the linear programme needed for the proof. 
The constraint set K is: 
The linear programme can be defined as 
max J = J ( P ,  'P, v f  p2) 
The proof that the fixed point is indeed the equilibrium proceeds, 
as usual in several stages. 
The goal function in the fixed point may be written as 
* 
Because J  is a maximum we may write, setting 
p = O a n d p  = v = O  2 
* * 
0 2 l~(z + s1 + 1 ,  v u ( p  E Kand p = 0, p2 = v = o  ; 1 
therefore in the fixed point: 
Note that this implies 
* * * 
wl = z 1 + s1 because -y  < 1 . 2 = 
* * 
Therefore in the following only zl + s1 will be used 
* * * * 
Define z = z  1 + s1 + z2 
Proof: 
Setting p = 0 and 1-1 = v = 0 we get 
* 
0 1 J = P 2 Z  - B p  ( p 2 ~ K a n d p = 0 ,  p = v = o  
* 
so that z 5 - 0 
* 
This holds by the construction of sl 
4) Complementarity conditions 
The goal function can be rewritten as 
All components are known to be less or equal zero, they 
are, therefore, equal to zero. 
* * * * 
Moreover, we know that 1-1 v = 0 so that p sl = 0 
as a consequence we may write 
.* * * 
a) p (zl . +  1) = 0 z + 1 ~ 0  1 - 
Proof: Knowins that 
* * * 
1 < 0 and z + s l + z 2 =  
w* * * * w * ~ *  
we get p (zl + sl + z2) = p < 0 2 = 
Interpretations of the model 
The model allows for an oligopolistic and an "altruistic" 
interpretation and shows clearly how "altruistic" institutions 
might be misused for oligopolistic purposes. 
Note that the larger the endowments of group 2 are in 
relation to those of group 1 the easier it is for group 2 to set 
the level of world market prices. As long as the constraints 1, 
r are ineffective the actual clearing is done by group 2 only. 
5. VARIOUS COllPENSATORY FINANCING SCHEEES 
5.1 Tarqet Prices 
We consider a compensatory financing scheme for one subset 
of countries supported by anocher subset. 
Here we distinguish three groups of countries 
1) Countries having a compensatory finance scheme 
2) Countries supporting this by limited income transfers 
3) Non-participating countries 
p is the actual world market price, 6 the target price for group 
1. The countries of the second group have the following balance 
of payments equation: 
- t with tmin 5 t 5 tmax PZ2 - - -
where t is the support to countries of group 1. 
Countries of group 1 receive the (possibly negative!) trans- 
fer. The balance of payments equation is 
pzl = t 
Where t is set in such a way that 
- 
pz, = a in which 6 is the target price 
and a is set such that: 
a = a  1 - a2 
a, (t - tmax) = 0 
a (tmin - t) = 0 2 (constaints on t, a) 
tmin 5 t 5 tmax 
- - 
0 al, a2t = 
Under the traditional assumption that z is a monotonously in- 1 
- 
creasing nonsaturing function of t, one can at given p, p, tmax, 
tmin, solve for (t, a) such that the constraints on it are satis- 
fied. This can be done in a two-step fashion 
1) Compute the value to of t corresponding to a = 0 
2) if to > tmax compute the value of a corresponding 
to t = tmax 
3) else if to < tmax compute the value of a corresponding 
to t = t~in. 
A d3agram will show that the constraints are satisfied. 
case 1 tmin 5 to 5 tmax 
- - 
case 2 to > tmax 
tmax 
to 
tmin 
tmax 
tmin 
case 3 to < tmin 
'tmax ---  - -  .- -- - 
.:7- 
As can be seen from the diagrams, in case 1 a = 0, 
in case 2 a < 0 and in case 3  a > 0. The resulting aggregate 
excess demand mapping p -+ z(p) is still uppersemicontinuous 
and satisfying p z  = 0 so that at world market level the computa- 
tional procedure remains the same as without compensatory financing. 
The procedure described here is admittedly somewhat unclean from 
the mathematical point of view. It however has the advantage that 
the dimensions of the world market equilibrium problem itself 
are not increased by the policy introduced. lloreover the com- 
putation of domestic equilibrium at unchanged world market prices 
is in general relatively straightforward and only affects countries 
of the first group so that the computational cost of the second 
iteration is very limited, while the necessary assumption of 
monoticity in t does not seem very restrictive for practical 
purposes. Note that if taxation limits are effective, a scheme 
for stabilizing income distribution within group 1 is still pos- 
sible (the situation in which group 2  does not contain any 
country is of course a special case of this). 
5 . 2  Target income 
We again have three groups of countries supported, supporting 
and nonparticipating. 
Suppose group 1 has a target income: k 
Its balance of trade equation is again 
P X1 = PY1 + t 
with pyl + t = k so that at given world market prices p the aid 
by group 2  is k - pyl . 
As long as no limits are set on t the computation of agg- 
regate excess demand is straightforward. Limits on t only 
restrict k but do not change the computations. 
5 . 3  Target quantities 
When output y is subject to random disturbances compensatory 
finance might can be such that the national income of the 
country is stabilized at its value for "normal" output levels 
* ' 
we denote this by y 
* 
For group 1 we get: px = py 
t may again be subjected to inequality constraints. As noted 
before, if all countries.are in group 1 only distribution and 
not the level of income can be subjected to a compensatory fin- 
ancing scheme. 
5. 4 Lagged compensation 
If the compensating transfers have a lag of one period or 
more, the transfers are predetermined in the model. One should 
realize, however, that even when the actual payments are lagged 
countries might alreaqy in the current period adapt their 
spending to the compensation scheme. 
APPENDIX 1 
Debreu's Excess Demand Theorem r l l  
Consider the set of excess demand function z = z(p), which 
satisfies p z(p) 5 - 0. Does this problem have a solution z 5 - O? 
Let p be the set of normalized prices. This is clearly a com- 
pact convex set. Denote by Z the set of all z(p) for p E P 
[Z is the union of the sets Z(p)]. If Z is not convex, we 
replace it by any compact convex set containinq Z, which we 
denote by Z'. 
Z(p) need not be compact. However the equilibrium nec- 
essarily lies within the subset of attainable states which is by 
assumption bounded (no infinite production). The set Z' can 
therefore be considered as the convex closure of a compact set Z 
which contains as a subset the set of attainable states. The 
excess demand correspondence can be defined as; 
Z. (p) z min [ki , Xi (p) - Yi (PI I 1 
where the mapping p + Z, clearly is U.S.C. (uppersemicontinuous) 
if both p + X I  and p + Y are U.S.C., k. being a constant 
1 
(continuous function of U.S.C. function is U.S.C.). We know, 
by assumption that Xi - Yi is bounded below. 
Therefore, the set Z is bounded and the set Z' is convex 
conpact. By construction an equilibrium in Z' will be within 
Z. In short the a priori information needed is that around the 
equilibrium point 
'i is bounded below and above, that Z is 
homogeneous of degree zero in p and that the correspondence 
p + Z(p) is U.S.C. 
These conditions have been assumed to hold in the present paper. 
Now define the set S (z) as follows: 
S(z) = [plpz is amaximum for z E z', p E PI . 
That is, we choose an arbitrary excess demand vector from the 
set of all excess demand vectors which are attainable at some 
prices, then find the price vector for khich the value of this 
excess demand Is maximized. It is important to note that the price 
vector is any price vector, not necessarily the particular p 
which is associated with z through the mapping p-?Z(p) 
Clearly z-S (z) is a mapping from Z into a subset of P. 
Since Z is convex we know this mapping to be upper semicontinuous. 
S(z) is a convex set since it is the intersection of the hyper- 
plane [y lyz = max pz] with P. 
Consider the set P x Z t ,  that is the set consisting of 
normalized price vectors paired with excess demand vectors. If 
we take some point p, z in P x Z', then Z(p) associates a set 
of excess demand vectors with p, and S(z) associates a set of price 
vectors with z. In other words, the mapping p, z j ~ ( p )  , ~ ( z )  
maps a point in P x Z' into a subset of P x Z'. 
We have shown the mapping z,->S (z) to be upper semicon- 
tinuous, and p-?Z(p) has been assumed to have the same property 
so that the combined mapping is upper semicontinuous also. 
We have shown that S(z) is convex and Z' (p) has been assumed 
convex, so that S (z) x Z ' (p) is convex. 
Thus, we have an upper semicontinuous mapping p, z----)Z (p) S (z) 
from the compact convex atP x Z' into a convex subset of itself. 
These are the conditions for invoking the Kakutani Fixed Point 
* 
Theorem. The theorem states that there exists some p , E PI 
* * * 
z E Z' which is a fixed point, that is, for which p E S(z ) 
* * 
and z E Z ( p  ) 
* * 
From the construction of S (z) , p E S (z ) implies that, 
for all p E P, 
Using the weak budget condition it follows that since 
* * 
z E Z ( p ) ,  
Thus, 
Clearly the last inequality is satisfied for all p E P 
only if 
thus proving the theorem. One important feature of this proof 
is that it does not require p and z to have the same dimension. 
The other important feature of this proof for our purpose 
is that S(z) = [~lmax pz for z E Z' , p E PI] represents the 
solution of a linear programme. 
max p z 
S.T. Cpi = 1 
APPENDIX 2 
A Note on the Com~utation of the Euuilibrium 
The existence proofs for the equilibrium proceeded along 
the lines of the proof of Debreu's excess demand theorem, for 
all models in this paper. We summarize the main features: 
1. y = y(x) is a continuous function 
satisfying xy = 0 ; 
2. x is restricted to a set K which , at given K, is bounded, 
Y 
compact convex and in the positive orthant 
3. Consider the following linear program 
max x y 
S.T.x E K y given 
Y 
This program was used in the proofs. 
n 4. Consider now C = Ix : y = f(x), x E R + ) .  Define 
Y 
K = IK : C ~ C K ~  n , y E I?+) . This set is not 
Y 
necessarily convex. However, if the variable y does not 
enter the constraint set, the set K coincides with K . 
Y 
In the previous proofs the variable y entered only in two 
instances: 
as ps = 0 §1,2,3,4 
- - 
and as (E p - q )  (i - i) = 0 in 32.2 
in the first case, the restriction may be removed if we 
know that in equilibrium p > 0 ; 
in the second case, the restriction plays a central role 
and cannot be removed, the remarks on computation therefore 
do not apply to 52.2 ; ; 
5. Consider the programs: 
- (a) min Cxi max (yi (x) , 0) 
S.T.  x E K 
where fi is a positive weight. 
(b) min max (yi(x)) 
S.T. x E K 
Both programs (and many others) have the same global solution 
which is at the same time the equilibrium. We shall use an 
algorithm [51 which can be shown to converge to a local minimum 
of the optimization problem but not to a global minimum. 1 )  
The computation can actually be performed in a space of a smaller 
. dimension that the dimension of the vector y. This is to be 
discussed in a separate paper. 
' )  This algorithm needs the assumption that y = y(x) is a con- 
tinuous but not necessarily differentiable function. 
-30- 
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